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Abstract
Nontraded inputs account for the lion's share of a Big Mac price (Ong 1997, Parsley and Wei
2003). Major departures from Big Mac PPP may then be explained by the
Balassa−Samuelson income differences effect, as shown e.g. by Click (1996). But it has been
argued that Click's result is not robust to changing estimation methods, sample of countries,
and time period (Fujiki and Kitamura 2003). Here we address a key theoretical distinction
between high and low income countries for the Balassa−Samuelson effect to be properly
evaluated. Since this distinction is missing in Click's analysis, we revisit his finding and take
a sample which is distinct (in terms of both set of countries and time period) to meet
Fujiki−Kitamura's criticism. We find that distinguishing high from low income makes no
harm to Click's result. But we also find that openness to trade (viewed as a proxy for trade
barriers) helps to explain departures from Big Mac PPP.
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1.  Introduction 
 
Purchasing power parity (PPP) theory is the notion that a dollar should buy the same amount in all 
countries.  PPP stands as the simplest nominal exchange rate theory.  According to PPP, in a 
somewhat elusive long run exchange rates vary to accompany the price level differences in two 
countries.  Thus the exchange rate between the two countries should ultimately move toward the 
rate that equalizes the prices of an identical basket of goods and services in each country. 
The Economist has suggested that the "basket" is a McDonald's Big Mac, which is produced 
in about 120 countries.  The Big Mac index has been released regularly by the magazine since its 
inception in September 1986.  So the Big Mac PPP is the nominal exchange rate that would mean 
hamburgers cost the same in the United States as abroad.  Given the price levels, comparing actual 
exchange rates with PPPs indicates whether a currency is under- or overvalued.  (We display an 
amusing illustration at http://www.angelfire.com/id/SergioDaSilva/bigmacppp.html). 
Wherever the relative merits of PPP, the Big Mac index can satisfactorily represent the 
theory (Pakko and Pollard 1996, 2003).  That relative PPP sounds more reasonable if compared to 
absolute PPP, for instance, is something that the Big Mac index can capture well. 
The Economist often stresses that its index is a "lighthearted" measure to make PPP more 
digestible.  PPP is not to be taken too seriously as Big Mac prices are not identical across countries 
once converted into a common currency.  PPP fails thanks to a number of reasons mainly related to 
trade barriers, nontradables, and pricing to market (Pakko and Pollard 2003).  Here we deal with the 
first two reasons.  As for pricing to market, Fujiki and Kitamura (2003) have suggested that 
McDonalds's quickly responds to fluctuations in nominal exchange rates on an almost one-to-one 
basis.  Anyway an enduring stylized fact of nominal exchange rate returns is "no PPP", i.e. neither 
form of PPP holds in the short run, while there is some evidence favoring (relative) PPP in the long 
run (De Vries 1994). 
As for nontradables, Click (1996) shows that Big Mac prices conform fairly well to PPP in a 
time-series dimension, and that country specific deviations are explained by the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect rather than by chance.  Some estimates show that nontraded goods (such as wages and rent) 
account for 94 percent of the price of a Big Mac (Ong 1997).  Parsley and Wei (2003) estimate that 
labor, rent, and electricity alone are responsible for 55.3 percent of a Big Mac's cost share.   
However Engel (1999) finds no convergence to PPP even if one looks at only traded goods, i.e. all 
movements in real exchange rates are due to deviations from the law of one price.  But Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2000) ponder that this is because even traded goods have a large nontraded component.  
Parsley and Wei (2003) argue, too, that using a Big Mac basket brings advantages if compared to a 
Consumer Price Index basket.  They then revisit Engel's result and find that reduced exchange rate 
volatility, lower transport cost, higher tariffs, and exchange rate pegs may dampen the Engel effect. 
Thus because nontradables are included in the Big Mac index, high income countries will 
have overvalued currencies relative to low income countries.  Fujiki and Kitamura (2003) employ 
standard statistical tests to evaluate Click's result that PPP holds conditional on the Balassa-
Samuelson income differences effect.  By taking both cross section and panel data, they conclude 
that the result is not robust to changing estimation methods, sample of countries, and time period. 
Here we revisit the findings of Click and take a sample that is also distinct in terms of both 
set of countries and time period.  We departure from Click's analysis and make a distinction 
between high and middle income countries.  Such a distinction is theoretically needed if the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect is to be taken consistently.  Indeed the Balassa-Samuelson's theory is 
useless if countries have similar per capita incomes (see a naked-eye piece of evidence on this at 
Table 2 of Pakko and Pollard 2003).  Thus one needs to consider different income groups of 
countries to properly evaluate the role of nontradables in departures from Big Mac PPP.  Here we 
do that only to find that neglecting such a distinction makes no harm to Click's result.  Unlike Click 
(and following Fujiki and Kitamura) we also employ Hausman test (to be described below) as a 
criterion for model selection.  
Arguably the Balassa-Samuelson effect might not be the sole reason for departures from Big 
Mac PPP (as seen).  Thus we further consider trade barriers as modeled by the degree of openness 
to trade.  We find that trade openness does help to explain departures from Big Mac PPP as well. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents data and our econometric 
model, Section 3 analyzes the data, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and model 
 
Data on Big Mac prices are collected from various issues of The Economist, and range from 
1995 to 2003.  (Pakko and Pollard 2003 provide them at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/03/11/0311mpd.xls).  Data on incomes are taken 
from the World Bank Development Indicators database for the time period 1995─2001.  High 
income countries include Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, 
South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan.  For the second group of middle income countries 
we have merged upper middle and lower middle income countries.  Mid income countries in this 
study then include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, 
and Thailand.  And data on trade openness are for the time period from 1995 to 2000, and are 
collected from the Penn World Table version 6.1 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002), which is 
available at pwt.econ.upenn.edu. 
We employ panel data to test the Big Mac PPP hypothesis, and models are estimated by 
searching for fixed and random effects.  A clear advantage of such an approach is to highlight 
individual heterogeneity. 
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where () it P P
*  is the ratio between a country's Big Mac price and the one in the United States,  it E  
is the nominal exchange rate (foreign currency per dollar), αi tracks individual effects and is fixed 
over time, and 
it u  is a random error.  If the αi's are correlated with the explanatory variables, the 
estimator of fixed effects is both consistent and efficient, whereas the estimator of random effects is 
not consistent.  If the αi's show no correlation with 
it E ln , so the random effects model generates 
consistent and efficient estimates, whereas the fixed effects model ends up consistent but not 
efficient (Hsiao 1986, Baltagi 1995, Greene 2003). 
To learn about which model is appropriate for a given data set, we employ Hausman (1978) 
test.  If a model is well specified, Hausman test contrasts the null hypothesis of suitability of the 
random effects model with the alternative hypothesis of appropriateness of the fixed effects model.  
In particular, Hausman test checks whether the coefficients estimated in the two models are equal.  
If the two estimates are not significantly distinct, the random effects model will be selected.   
Conversely, if the estimates are significantly distinct, the fixed effects model will be chosen. 
The test statistic is 
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where the rows and columns of vectors and matrices that correspond to the intercept have been 
dropped together with the rows and columns of parameters that cannot be estimated by the fixed  
effects model.  Under the null hypothesis, w is  ( )
2 k χ  distributed, where k is the number of 
estimated coefficients in β  apart from the intercept and time invariant regressors. 
For Big Mac PPP to hold, the null hypothesis  0 0 = β  and  1 1 = β  cannot be jointly rejected.  
Otherwise PPP fails to hold, and prices are not dependent on the exchange rate.  This might imply 
that either prices are set at distinct base levels ( 0 0 ≠ β ), prices do not change as the exchange rate 
changes ( 1 1 ≠ β ), or both (Click 1996). 
 
3.  Analysis 
 
A simple test for Big Mac PPP is to evaluate whether  ( ) 0 ln
* = it t it E P P  holds on average.  Table 1 
shows that this cannot be rejected for mid and high income countries, and for the countries taken 
together.  This result departures from Click's, where a zero mean is not found.  But if we carry out 
the test for data of a given particular year, the null hypothesis is rejected for 2002 and 2003 for the 
mid income countries.  (For 2002, mean of –39.3, standard deviation of 18.4, and t statistic of –2.1; 
for 2003, mean of –40.5, standard deviation of 13.6, and t statistic of –2.97.) 
  Figure 1 displays  ) ln(
* P P  against  E ln .  A possible linear relationship between the 
variables emerges (intercept and angular coefficient of nil and one respectively).  This suggests that 
Big Mac PPP might hold.  Thus we test such a hypothesis using panel data. 
  Hausman test in Table 2 shows that the random effects model is significant.  One cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of coefficient equivalence at the significance level of 5 percent for each 
group of countries and for the two groups merged.  For each group the random effects model 
estimated according to equation (1) shows intercept and angular coefficient that are significant at 
the one percent level.  For the groups taken together the intercept is not significant and the angular 
coefficient approaches one.  The latter result is more in line with the hypothesis of PPP.  The 
2 / χ F  
statistic, which tests whether the constant and coefficients on the regressors are jointly zero, shows 
that the adjustment of the three models to the data is significant. 
At this point one cannot jump to the conclusion that Big Mac PPP holds.  One needs to 
further test whether condition  0 0 = β  and  1 1 = β  jointly holds.  Table 2 shows that this is rejected.  
We then turn to check whether income differences provide a reason for this Big Mac PPP failure. 
Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) have warned that nontradables can systematically 
account for departures from PPP.  So the Big Mac price in a country may convey more information 
than that in the prices of its ingredients because nontraded goods should be used to sell Big Macs.  
If nontradables are part of the cost of the sandwich, deviations from PPP may reflect possible 
different costs across countries.  In Balassa-Samuelson's theory, labor in poor countries is less 
productive than labor in the traded sector of developed countries.  Thus including nontradables in 
the basket that reckons price indices produces high income countries with relatively overvalued 
currencies.  Higher productivity in these countries is the reason why that happens.  It is then implied 
that the theory is useless for two countries with similar per capita incomes.  One needs to consider 
different income groups of countries, and this is precisely what we have been doing in this paper. 
Click (1996) argues that Big Mac PPP failures are due uniquely to the individual effects of 
countries, which are time invariant.  And since nontraded inputs in a Big Mac vary across countries, 
this fact (he reasons) may well explain departures from PPP. 
  To consider the influence of differences in income, we then carry out new estimates of the 
models by taking  ()
* ln Y Y  as an explanatory variable.  As before, Big Mac PPP continues to be 
rejected after adding  ()
* ln Y Y  to the regression (Table 3).  Pakko and Pollard (2003) show in Table 
2 of their paper that the Balassa-Samuelson effect is not clearly seen for advanced economies but a 
pattern of undervaluation emerges for developing countries (apart from Latin America).  As 
theoretically expected, our Table 3 shows that the income variable is significant for mid income 
countries and the countries taken together; this is so because in these samples income differences  
relative to that in the US are not negligible.  (Taiwan has been dropped as information is missing.)  
Indeed for the high income country sample, the  ( )
* ln Y Y  coefficient in the fixed effects model 
selected by Hausman test is not significant. 
As observed, another classic reason for departures from PPP is trade barriers.  Cassel (1922) 
has early warned that if a country adopts export restrictions, its currency will end up undervalued on 
a PPP basis.  Similarly it can be inferred that if a country restricts its imports (through tariffs and 
quotas) local prices will be greater then foreign prices, thereby making its currency overvalued if 
compared with PPP.  Now we aim to track such an effect by considering trade openness as an extra 
explanatory variable.  The greater the openness, arbitrage is heightened and deviations from PPP 
abate.  We make no distinction between income groups of countries once that should be relevant for 
evaluating the Balassa-Samuelson effect only. 
Both fixed and random effects models present significant coefficients at the 5 percent level 
(Table 4).  (Thailand is left out as information is missing.)  The Big Mac PPP hypothesis is rejected 
for the fixed effects model selected by Hausman test at the one percent significance level.  As 
expected, the trade openness coefficient presents the right negative sign throughout, which means 
that a Big Mac is cheaper wherever openness is greater. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
This paper shows that Big Mac PPP fails to hold and considers both income and trade effects for 
explaining such a failure.  We find that less productive countries tend to have currencies that are 
undervalued on a PPP basis.  This finding is consistent with previous work.  We also find that 
countries that are more opened to trade show less deviations from PPP.  Although this is 
theoretically well known for long, our result is novel for PPP in terms of a Big Mac basket. 
Balassa-Samuelson's theory is useless if two countries have similar per capita incomes.   
Thus one needs to consider different income groups of countries to properly evaluate the role of 
nontradables in departures from Big Mac PPP.  This has not been done by previous works, such as 
that of Click (1996).  So here we make this necessary distinction only to show that it makes no harm 
to Click's result.  








Mid Income  90  −0.28852 
(0.234888)  −1.22834 
High Income  99  0.03 
(0.388604)  0.073736 
Both Groups  189  −0.12238 
(0.360646)  −0.33934 
 
Table 1.  Simple test for Big Mac PPP. 
 
Notes 
The hypothesis that  ( ) 0 * ln = it E t P it P  holds on average cannot be rejected, and this presents 









































































































Prob>Chi2=0.0000    Chi2(2)=9.31 
Prob>Chi2=0.0095 














Observations  0 β   1 β   2 β   2 R   F/Chi2 Hausman  Test 
Null Hypothesis 
0 0 = β , 1 1 = β





















 Random  70  −0.39554 
(0.1123384)* 
1.016996 




























 Random  70  0.8182858 
(0.2608979)* 
0.5696438 






















































Prob>F=0.0000   
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* 2 1 0 * ln ln ln β β β  
Notes 





Observations  0 β   1 β   2 β   2 R   F/Chi2 Hausman  Test 
Null Hypothesis 

































Prob>Chi2=0.0000    Chi2(3)=7.52 
Prob>Chi2=0.0570 
Table 4.  Regression  01 2 * ln ln ln
P
EO p e n u
P





* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, NS non-significant, (  ) standard error  





Mid Income Countries  





High Income Countries  





Both Groups of Countries  
Figure 1.  
* ln P P  versus  E ln . 
 
Note 
A linear relationship between the two variables is suggested by a zero intercept and an angular coefficient of one.  This presents 
evidence for Big Mac PPP that is only casual.  
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